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POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
Fighting over Peanuts? The European Union Budget 
 
• Top of the agenda at the European Union (EU) summit on 15/16 December 2005 is the budget for 
2007-13. The original proposal from the European Commission was for a budget of one trillion 
euros or 1.21% of EU gross national income (GNI). The proposal at the end of the Luxembourg 
presidency, rejected at the summit in June 2005, was for 871 billion euros (1.06% of EU GNI). 
Six months, and much discussion later, the UK’s proposal is for 847 billion euros (1.03% of EU 
GNI).  
 
• Any changes to the overall size and composition of the budget as a result of the summit are likely 
to be marginal. The current UK proposal includes cuts in development aid to new member states, 
cuts in rural aid to old member states, a major review of all spending in 2008 and a small 
reduction in the UK’s rebate.  
 
• Of the current EU budget, approximately 45% goes on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
35% on structural funds (the EU’s supra-national regional policy) and 7% each on aid, 
administration and a diverse range of other policies. 
 
• The CAP has several negative effects. These include artificially inflating food prices in the EU, 
which is bad for consumers, particularly poorer ones; driving down the world price of food, 
which is bad for countries that produce food, many of which are poor and middle-income 
countries; and encouraging overproduction and specialisation by farmers, both of which may be 
bad for the environment. 
 
• Major reform of the CAP would use the principle of subsidiarity to repatriate the CAP to national 
level where it clearly belongs. 
 
• There are two main problems with the EU’s structural funds. First, the allocation of expenditure 
is highly political and as a result not well targeted on the poorest regions in the poorest countries. 
Second, the expenditure itself has not been very effective: no Objective 1 region (those targeted 
by the funds) has moved out of the category. 
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• Major reform of the structural funds would remove the redistributive element that gives funding 
to richer countries and focus all expenditure on the poorest regions in the expanded EU. This 
would also involve cuts for regions that were Objective 1 in the old EU15, but are now above 
average income in the EU25. The current proposals would continue to fund these regions despite 
the entry of much poorer regions.   
 
• EU spending on administration includes the costs of running the institutions supporting the single 
market, which deliver large economic gains to the EU as a whole. Thus, a tiny proportion of the 
budget is leveraged into much larger gains. 
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Introduction 
 
‘If we cannot get a large deal, which alters fundamentally the way the budget is spent, 
then... we will have to have a smaller EU budget.’ 
Tony Blair, 1 December 2005, Kiev. 
 
The argument over the UK’s rebate has created much heat on how European Union (EU) 
spending should be financed. But it has shed little light on the fundamental questions of the 
appropriate size and composition of the EU budget. What should be the EU’s spending 
priorities and how much should it be spending in total? This analysis lays out the main current 
areas of spending and how they might be reformed. 
 
The EU’s latest enlargement has brought these matters to a head, but arguably a serious 
debate about the EU budget is long overdue. The fact that this discussion is taking place after 
the entry of ten new member states rather than before is only likely to increase the problems 
of reaching agreement. This is particularly true because the fiasco over the constitution means 
the EU has failed to resolve the one thing on which the constitution should have been focused 
– the way in which decisions are reached within the EU. 
 
 
The Common Agricultural Policy 
 
The Treaty of Rome (1957) spelled out the objectives of the CAP, which now takes up 
roughly 45% of the EU budget: increased productivity, a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community, market stabilisation, ensuring the availability of supplies and 
ensuring that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. While it has succeeded in 
achieving its aim of self-sufficiency, the associated costs go far beyond the budgetary costs 
that have been highlighted in the recent debate. 
 
The CAP has used an array of instruments to try to reach these objectives. Taking all these 
instruments together, the OECD estimates that between 2002 and 2004, producer support 
accounted for, on average, 34% of farm receipts in the EU.1 
 
There are two main types of support: market-based support and direct support. Around 65% 
of EU support is market-based while direct payments to farmers account for another 30%.2 
These direct payments are often based on historical entitlement. 
 
The distribution of support is very unequal. Market support obviously tends to favour large 
farmers who sell the most. Direct support need not benefit large farmers more, but in the EU 
it does. This is because direct support has been implemented incrementally and the levels 
have usually been decided on so as to compensate farmers for whatever level of market 
support was disappearing. 
 
As market support benefits larger farmers, this use of historical payment entitlements to 
calculate continuing direct support means that it is very unfairly distributed too. To give just 
one example, in 2002, farms of 0-1.25 hectares accounted for 50% of farms in the EU, but 
received only 4.3% of direct payments. Farms of 20 hectares or above accounted for 5% of 
                                                 
1 See OECD (2005), ‘Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005’. 
Highlights are available from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/27/35016763.pdf 
2 OECD (2005): Figure 1.5 . 
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the EU’s farms and received 50% of direct payments.3 The benefits from both direct and 
market support are very unequally distributed. 
 
Both types of support distort the agricultural market although market support is more 
distortionary than direct support. In 2003, the EU agreed reforms to the CAP that would 
involve less market support and more direct payments under something called the single 
payment scheme. 
 
The extent to which direct support distorts the market depends on whether or not it is fully or 
only partially ‘decoupled’. Direct support is partially decoupled when the direct payment is 
independent of the amount produced but still requires the farmer to grow the same crop on the 
land as was grown prior to the move to direct payment. For example, if the payment is based 
on the fact that historically the farmer grew wheat, they must still grow wheat to get the 
payment. 
 
Under full decoupling, farmers can, roughly speaking, do whatever they like with the land and 
still get the payments. The degree to which payments are partially or fully decoupled depends 
on both the crop and the country. For example, under the single payment scheme, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK chose to maximise, while France chose to minimise, 
the extent of decoupling allowed under the reform.  
 
The current situation 
 
• Significant amounts of market support will remain even under the reformed CAP. EU 
prices for major products, such as wheat, will still be kept above world prices and 
export subsidies used to offload excess production on world markets. 
 
• The EU will see growing use of direct support although much of this direct support 
will still be distortionary because it will only be partially decoupled. 
 
• Some sectors that are of most concern to developing countries, in particular sugar and 
cotton, still remain very heavily distorted. 
 
The negative impact of the CAP 
 
• The CAP makes EU food prices artificially high. This is bad for consumers. It is 
particularly bad for poor consumers who spend a higher proportion of their income on 
food. In other words, the impact is regressive. 
 
• High food prices encourage overproduction by EU farmers and also divert farmers’ 
energies from other activities (such as tourism). Higher prices for farm outputs raise 
the costs of inputs. In particular, the prices of land and of patented/branded chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides are higher as a result of the CAP. Research suggests that 
these input providers might actually gain more than twice as much as farmers from 
price support.4 
 
                                                 
3 Source: Table 3.6.1.10 in ‘Agriculture in the EU – Statistics and Economic Information’, European 
Commission (2002), reproduced in Baldwin and Wyplosz (2004), The Economics of European 
Integration. 
4 See Mahé and Ortalo-Magné (1999), ‘Five Proposals for a European Model of the Countryside, 
Economic Policy. 
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• On world markets, the combination of lower demand from EU consumers and higher 
supply from EU farmers drives down the world price of food. This is bad for 
countries that produce food, many of which are poor and middle-income countries. It 
may help some very poor countries that are reliant on food imports. But the overall 
impact on these food-importing countries may still be negative when taking account 
of the knock-on effects from EU agricultural policies that distort sectors in which 
these poor countries are exporters.  
 
• Overproduction on a given amount of land requires higher inputs of chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides. This intensification may be bad for the environment. For 
animal production, intensification implies farming techniques that run counter to 
current demands for better animal welfare. 
 
• High stable prices encourage farmers to specialise because they do not need the 
insurance that is provided by a diversified farm producing lots of different goods. 
This specialisation means less diverse local eco-systems, which may be bad for the 
environment. 
 
• These negative effects on the environment reduce the ‘public good’ aspect of the 
countryside that comes from its use for recreation by non-rural households. This is 
ironic, because this public good aspect remains a key reason why some form of 
agricultural subsidies may be justified. 
 
• ‘Public good’ aspects also matter in the fact that the CAP’s focus on farmers ignores 
other elements of the rural economy. These other elements may be more important 
than farming and yet may be negatively affected by policies developed with only 
farmers in mind. (The UK’s recent experience with foot and mouth disease shows just 
how important these considerations can be.) 
 
A ‘large deal’ on the CAP 
 
There are many proposals floating around for further reform of the CAP. But it should be 
clear by now that a ‘large deal’ on the EU budget would involve a fundamental reform of the 
CAP. A ‘very large deal’ would preferably use the principle of subsidiarity to repatriate the 
CAP to national level where it clearly belongs. 
 
Repatriating CAP to the national level would have several benefits: 
 
• First, different countries have very different views on what form agricultural policy 
should take. At the moment, everyone is forced to compromise. 
 
• Second, from an economist’s perspective, the overall level of distortion is likely to be 
lower with the CAP repatriated. 
 
• Third, the resulting budget would be considerably smaller and the justification for the 
UK’s rebate considerably reduced. 
 
• Fourth, the CAP is highly redistributive across EU countries and it is the 
redistributive elements of the EU budget that are the most controversial. 
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Structural funds  
 
Like the CAP, the EU’s structural funds form a large budget item – 35% of the total – with a 
significant redistributive element. There are a number of components to the structural funds, 
all of them essentially aimed at dealing with the fact that EU economic activity is highly 
concentrated geographically at the national level as well as within nations. In other words, 
some countries and regions are much richer than others. 
 
The EU identifies poor regions according to different objectives. By far the most important of 
these is Objective 1. To be Objective 1, a region must have GDP per capita that is 75% or less 
of the EU average. These regions then get the lion’s share of structural fund expenditure – 
planned at around 80% in the proposals for 2007-2013.5 
 
The main problem with the current structural funds is that they have not done a very good job. 
To give just one example, no Objective 1 region has, as yet, moved out of the Objective 1 
category (other than as a result of boundary changes). There appear to be two main problems. 
First, the allocation of expenditure is highly political and as a result not well targeted. Second, 
the expenditure itself has not been very effective. 
 
The allocation of structural fund spending 
 
The structural funds are a supra-national regional policy. Setting aside the pros and cons of a 
national regional policy, the economic argument for an EU-wide policy is one of targeting. It 
should allow member states to target the most disadvantaged regions in the Union. 
 
Rather surprisingly, in the 2000-06 spending period, less than 50% of EU structural funding 
went to the four poorest nations – the ‘cohesion four’ of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Germany got 15%, the UK 9% and France 8%.6 
 
Of course these nations have problem regions, but the financial targeting argument should see 
resources flowing to the poorest regions in the poorest countries with richer nations left to 
deal with their own regional problems. This does not happen because structural fund 
expenditures are highly political and used as a redistributive element in the EU budget. 
 
Types of structural fund spending 
 
There are three main types of structural fund expenditure in Objective 1 regions. Aid for 
production sectors accounts for around 40%, infrastructure accounts for around 30%, with 
human resources taking the other 30%. 
 
Evidence is beginning to emerge that the first two of these do very little for regional 
disparities. Production support is often targeted at the wrong things: either propping up 
declining industries or attracting high technology activities that do little to help local 
residents.7 
 
Infrastructure investment may be vital for the completion of the single market but it has had 
little effect on regional disparities (as is so often the case when trying to tackle two objectives 
                                                 
5 See proposals for the new structural funds regulations for the period 2007-13: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/newregl0713_en.htm 
6 See Baldwin and Wyplosz (2004) The Economics of European Integration, Table 9.3. 
7 See Midelfart and Overman (2002), ‘Delocation and European Integration: Is structural spending 
justified?’ Economic Policy. 
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with one instrument).8 Investment in human resources does appear to have some impact, but 
its share in expenditure has traditionally been low and has only risen in recent years. 
 
A ‘large deal’ on structural funds 
 
Major budgetary reform of the structural funds would remove the redistributive element that 
gives funding to richer countries and focus all expenditure on the poorest regions in the 
expanded EU. This would also involve cuts for regions that were Objective 1 in the old EU15, 
but are now above average income in the EU25 (because the EU average income has fallen). 
 
The current budget proposals would continue to fund these regions despite the entry of much 
poorer regions in the new member states. A ‘very large deal’ on this might see the budget 
slashed and all expenditure becoming project-based with decisions according to economic and 
social evaluations only.9  
 
 
EU spending beyond agriculture and regional policy 
 
Roughly 7% of the EU budget goes on development aid to poor countries. Another 7% goes 
on administration. And 7% goes on a range of policies falling under such headings as 
audiovisual technology, consumers rights, culture, energy, enterprise, environment, foreign 
and security policy, fraud, human rights, information society, institutional affairs, public 
health, research and innovation, taxation and transport. 
 
EU spending on administration includes the costs of running the European Commission, the 
European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and all the other European institutions. It 
is these institutions that support the running of the single market. 
 
Most economists think that the single market delivers reasonably large economic gains to the 
EU as a whole: estimates range from 4% to 12% of EU GDP. Thus, a tiny proportion of the 
budget is leveraged into much larger gains. 
 
Of course, as with any bureaucracy, there is waste that could and should be targeted. But the 
(at times obsessive) focus on the Brussels bureaucracy targets the one component of the EU 
that fairly certainly delivers considerable economic benefits to member states and which in 
any case constitutes a tiny fraction of the budget. 
 
 
How should EU spending be financed? 
 
The EU budget contributions are calculated on the basis of GNP (80%) and VAT receipts 
(20%) with tiny components based on customs and agricultural duties. A large deal on the EU 
budget, which removed many of the redistributive elements, would mean that the current 
formula produced net contributions roughly in proportion to GDP, presumably removing the 
need for the UK rebate. 
 
 
For further information: contact Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (romesh@compuserve.com). 
                                                 
8 Rodriguez Pose and Fratesi (2004), ‘Between Development and Social Policies: The impact of 
European structural funds in Objective 1 regions’, Regional Studies. 
9 Richard Baldwin at HEI in Geneva has recently put forward this argument. See: 
http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin  
